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JURISDICTION 
THE RESPONDENT INAPPLICABILITY OF JURISDICTION IS 
GROUNDLESS. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THE RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT # 4 CONTAINS THE WRONG DATE 
OF THE HEARING INSTEAD OF DECEMBER 3, THE HEARING WAS HELD 
OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1988. 
THE ORDER REFERRED TO IN # 5 WAS SIGNED BY JUDGE SAWAYA 
WITHOUT NOTICE TO PETITIONER OR HIS COUNSEL, NOR WERE THEY 
GIVEN ANY CHANCE TO OBJECT TO THE CONTENTS OR FORM OF SAID 
ORDER. 
STATEMENT # 9 SHOULD REFLECT THE PETITIONER LEFT 
THE STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AS A TRAVELING SALESMAN AND THAT 
THE PETITIONER WAS NOT CONTINUOUSLY OUT THE STATE DURING 
THAT TIME PERIOD SO DESCRIBED THEREIN. 
ARGUMENT 
STANDARD TO BE USED FOR DETERMINATION STAY ON APPEAL 
THE R E S P O N D E N T / D E F E N D A N T E R R O N E O U S L Y PLACES RELIANCE ON 
JENSEN V. SCHWENDIMAN, 744 P.2D 1026, FOR THE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW OF A CASE NOT INVOLVING A STAY OF AN ORDER SUSPENDING 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES TO SUSPECTED DRUNK DRIVERS. THAT CASE 
ENUMERATED THE STAY ON APPEAL RULE TO BE (1) STRONG SHOWING 
OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS," (2) IRREPARABLE HARM,' (3) NO 
SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO THE OTHER PARTYJ (4) LACK OF HARM TO THE 
PUBLIC. HOWEVER, THE JENSEN CASE EXPLICITLY STATED ITS 
STANDARD WAS APPLICABLE TO IMPLIED CONSENT CASES: 
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"DRIVER WOULD 
KNOWING THAT THERE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
DE NOVO HEARING IN 
HAVE A INCENTIVE TO REFUSE CHEMICAL TESTS 
COULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL DELAY IN 
SUSPENSION IF AN APPEAL IS TAKEN FROM THE 
THE DISTRICT COURT. ABSENT A STRONG 
SHOWING OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS; THE 
BALANCING OF THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING AN 
APPLICATION FOR A STAY OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION TIPS 
IN FAVOR OF DENYING A STAY DUE TO THE IMPORTANT PUBLIC 
POLICY IMPLICATION." 
AND AT! 
"AS NOTED IN THIS COURT'S OPINION IN KEHL V. 
SCHWENDIMAN, 735 P.2D 413 (UT. APP. 1987)< NOVEL ISSUES 
RAISED IN SUCH CASES CAN ELUDE APPELLATE REVIEW DUE TO THE 
EXPIRATION OF THE ONE"YEAR SUSPENSION PERIOD. FOR THIS 
REASON; WE CONCLUDE THAT A STAY MAY BE GRANTED IN CASES 
WHERE THE MERITS WOULD OTHERWISE JUSTIFY AN EXERCISE OF THIS 
COURT'S JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES." 
AND; 
"AS TO THE THIRD ELEMENT; THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF 
HARM DIRECTLY 'INTERESTED PARTIES' IN DRIVER'S LICENSE 
SUSPENSION ACTIONS. HOWEVER; AS TO THE FINAL ELEMENT' "HARM 
TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST'; WE ARE CONVINCED THAT A ROUTINELY 
GRANTING STAYS BASED SOLELY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF MOOTNESS 
COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
REMOVING DRUNK DRIVERS FROM THE ROAD. THE PURPOSE OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR DRIVERS' LICENSE REVOCATION IS 
NOT TO PUNISH INDIVIDUAL DRIVERS; BUT TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC. 
BALLARD V. STATE, 595 P.2D 1302 (UTAH 1979)" 
NOT ONLY DOES JENSEN SPECIFICALLY STATE WHAT AND WHY IT 
IS LIMITED TO; BUT HIDING BEHIND THE CASE IS THE MOOTNESS 
ISSUE REFERRED TO THE DECISION AT P. 1028, A DEVICE THAT IS 
USED BY LITIGANTS IN IMPLIED CONSENT CASES IS TO OBTAIN A 
STAY OF THEIR LICENSE SUSPENSIONS WHILE ON APPEAL; PERMIT 
THE TIME TO RUN; THEN MOOT THE ISSUE. ALL THE TIME BEING 
ALLOWED TO DRIVE. 
THE JENSEN CASE IS CLEARLY A HYBRID FROM THE GENERAL 
LAW CONCERNING STAYS FOUND IN STATE V. NEELY; 707 P . 2 D 647 
(UT. 1985); AND STATE V. PAPPAS, 696 P.2D 1188 (UT. 1985), 
AND RULE 8 OF THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. THOSE CASES 
3 
ARE CRIMINAL STANDARDS AND EVEN APPLYING THOSE THE APPELLANT 
HAS SHOWN HE IS ENTITLED TO A STAY. STATE V. NEELY AT: 
"THERE ARE TWO PRONGS TO THE TEST FOR DETERMINING 
WHETHER ISSUES RAISED ARE "SUBSTANTIAL." FLRST. THE 
QUESTION RAISED MUST BE EITHER (1) NOVELI I .E. . THERE IS NO 
UTAH PRECEDENT THAT GOVERNS* OR (2) FAIRLY DEBATABLE. A 
LEGAL ISSUE IS FAIRLY DEBATABLE IF UTAH PRECEDENT BEARING IF 
ON THE ISSUE PRESENT CONFLICTING POINTS OF VIEW WHEN APPLIED 
TO THE FACT OF THE CASE OR IS OTHERWISE UNCLEAR." 
THE COURT WENT ON TO FIND THAT THE APPEALS WERE NOT 
PLAINLY FRIVOLOUS. AT 650. 
THE PETITIONER ARGUES THAT RULE 8 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE DOES NOT INVOKE A STANDARD SUCH AS IS 
FOUND IN JENSEN, SUPRA, AND THAT IN THE JENSEN CASE 
EXPRESSLY STATES WHAT FACTUAL SITUATION IT IS GOVERNING, AND 
NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE PETITIONERS CASE. HE IS 
ASKING FOR A STAY FROM AN ORDER TERMINATING ALL CONTACT 
BETWEEN HIM AND HIS DAUGHTER ONLY BECAUSE HE IS FINANCIALLY 
INCAPABLE OF PAYING THE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT ORDER EY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
THERE IS NO CASE IN THE UNITED STATES, SINCE 1971 THAT 
ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT. LET ALONE ELIMINATE. CHILD VISITATION FOR 
THE SOLE REASON OF NON-PAYMENT (EVEN IF WILLFUL) OF CHILD 
SUPPORT.* IT IS CLEAR THAT JUDGE SAWAYA IS TRYING TO DO JUST 
THAT. 
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT JENSEN IS THE STANDARD FOR 
A STAY ON THE ISSUE OF THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT, THE 
* PLEASE SEE APPENDIX "A" FOR A LIST OF CASES IN THE UNITED 
STATES HOLDING AGAINST THE PROPOSITION OF THE LIMITATION OF 
VISITATION FOR THE NO-PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT. 
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PETITIONER BELIEVES A STRONG LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS HAS BEEN 
SHOWN FOR HIS PROPOSITION THAT YOU CANNOT CONDITION 
VISITATION ON CHILD SUPPORT. 
THE SITUATION IS PRECISELY OPPOSITE FROM JENSEN - THERE 
IS A STRONG PUBLIC POLICY IN FAVOR OF THE PARENT-CHILD 
RELATIONSHIP - TO ANALOGIZE THAT KEEPING A INTOXICATED 
DRIVER OFF THE ROAD IS THE SAME AS THAT IS WRONG AND NOTHING 
BUT HARM CAN RESULT IN APPLYING SUCH HARSH STANDARD TO AN 
OTHERWISE COMMENDABLE ENDEAVOR. 
PETITIONER ASSERTS THAT IS WOULD NOT BE PRACTICABLE TO 
REQUEST RELIEF FROM THE DISTRICT FOR THIS STAY BECAUSE; AS 
THE COURT OF APPEAL NOTED IN ORAL ARGUMENT, THE ATTITUDE OF 
JUDGE SAWAYA ASSURES HIS DENIAL OF SUCH A MOTION, AND IN 
FACT JUDGE SAWAYA DID DENY PETITIONER ORIGINAL REQUEST FOR 
STAY.* 
CONCLUSION 
THE PETITIONER ASK THIS FOR A STAY OF JUDGE SAWAYA 
JANUARY 9, 1991 ORDER BECAUSE, NOT ONLY IS HE BEING PUNISH, 
THE EFFECT OF THE ORDER IS THAT HIS DAUGHTER BE BEING DENIED 
HER FATHERS' LOVE AND AFFECTION AND HAS SUFFER HARM, IN THAT 
SHE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO ATTEND HER SCHOOL FATHER DAUGHTER 
PARTY THIS YEAR AND GRADUATED FROM ELEMENTARY WITHOUT HER 
FATHER TO WATCH HER, ALONG WITH ALL THE OTHER THINGS THAT 
ENTAILED WITH A FATHER-DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIP. 
* SEE APPENDIX "B" FOR A COPY OF THE NOVEMBER 26, 1991 
HEARING WHEREIN JUDGE SAWAYA TOLD PETITONER THAT HE WAS 
GOING TO DENY HIS VISITATION RIGHT. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 5TH DAY OF JUNE; 1991. 
LLOYD D. COLEY 
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APPENDIX 
A 
CASES THAT HELD THAT IT IS IMPROPER 
TO DENY A FATHER'S VISITATION MERELY FOR 
HIS FAILURE TO PAY SUPPORT 
COLORADO 
KANE V. KANE,(1964) 154 COLO 440, 390 P.2D 361. 
FLORIDA 
HOWARD V. HOWARD,(1962, FLA APP D3) 143 SO 2 D 502 (BY 
I M P L I C A T I O N ) ; CHAFFIN V GRIGSBY, (1974, FLA APP D 4 ) 293 so 
2D 404 (BY I M P L I C A T I O N ) ; HECHLER V HECHLER, (1977, FLA APP 
D 3 ) 351 so 2D 1122 (BY IMPLICATION); ACKER V ACKER, (1978, 
FLA APP D 2 ) 365 so 2D 180; FRAZIER V FRAZIER, (1981, FLA APP 
D 2 ) 395 so 2D 590; QLSQN V QLSON, (1981, FLA APP D3) 398 sO 
2s 491; MADDUX v MADDUX, (1986, FLA APP D 4 ) 495 so 2D 863, 
11 FLW 2129. 
GEORGIA 
PRICE v DAWKINS (1978) 242 GA 41, 247 SE 2D 844. 
IDAHO 
WILSON v WILSON (1953) 73 IDAHO 326, 252 P.2D 197. 
ILLINOIS 
COMISKEY V COMISKEY (1977, 1ST DIST) 48 ILL APP 3 D 17, 8 ILL 
DEC 925, 366 NE2D 87, APP DEN 66 ILL 2D 629, LATER 
PROCEEDING (1ST DIST) 125 ILL APP 3D 30, 80 ILL DEC 541, 465 
NE2D 653, LATER PROCEEDING (1ST DIST) 146 ILL APP 3D 804, 
100 ILL DEC 364, 497 NE2D 342 (BY I M P L I C A T I O N ) ; HESS V HESS 
(1980, 3D DIST) 87 ILL APP 3D 947, 42 ILL DEC 882, 409 NE2D 
497. 
IOWA 
SWEAT v SWEAT (1974)238 IOWA 999, 29 NW2D 180; SMITH V SMITH 
(1966) 258 IOWA 1315, 142 NW2D 421 (APPARENTLY RECOGNIZING 
R U L E ) ; KLOBNOCK V ABBOTT (1981, LOWA) 303 NW2D 149. 
LOUISIANA 
ROSHTO v ROSHTO (1949) 214 LA 922, 39 SO2D 344 (BY 
I M P L I C A T I O N ) , CROOKS v CROOKS (1982, LA APP 3D CIR) 425 SO2D 
344 (BY IMPLICATION). 
MARYLAND 
RADFORD v RADFORD (1960) 223 MD 483, 164 A2D 904, 88 ALR2D 
140; STANCIL V STANCIL (1979) 286 MD 530, 408 A2D 1030. 
MICHIGAN 
STEVENSON V STEVENSON (1977) 74 MICH APP 656, 254 NW2D 337. 
MINNESOTA 
VAN ZEE v VAN ZEE (1974) 302 MINN 371, 226 NV/2D 865; ENGLAND 
V ENGLAND (1983, MINN) 337 NW2D 681 (BY IMPLICATION). 
MONTANA 
STATE EX REL. WILLIAMS V WILLIAMS (1983, MO APP) 647 SW2D 
590. 
NEW JERSEY 
WAGNER v WAGNER (1971) 165 NJ SUPER 553, 398 A2D 918 (BY 
IMPLICATION); RE ADOPTION OF P. (1980) 175 NJ SUPER 420, A2D 
1135 (BY IMPLICATION). 
NEW YORK 
FARHI V FARHI (1978, 4TH DEPT) 64 APP DIV 2 D 840, 407 NYS2D 
840; CHIRUMBOLO v CHIRUMBOLO (1980 4TH DEPT) 75 APP DIV 2D 
992, 429 NYS2D 112, ENGRASSIA V PI LULLO (1982, 2D DEPT) 89 
APP DIV 957, 454 NTS2D 103. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPT. OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES ON BEHALF OF SALLIE M.H. v JAMES c.p.(1983) 119 
MISC 2D 649, 464 NYS2D 942. 
OHIO 
JOHNSQN V J O H N S Q N (1977, SUMMIT CO) 52 OHIO APP 2D 180, 6 
OHIO OPS 3D 170, 368 NE2D 1273; FLYNN V FLYNN (1984, MADISON 
CO) 15 OHIO APP 3D 34, 15 OHIO BR 57, 472 NE2D 388. 
OKLAHOMA 
RE MCMENAMIN (1957, OKLA) 310 P2D 381 (BY IMPLICATION). 
PENNSYLVANIA 
COMMONWEALTH EX REL. LOTZ V LQTZ (1958) 188 PA SUPER 241, 
146 A2D 362, AFFD 396 PA 287, 152 A2D 663. 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
GARRIS v MCDUFFIE (1986, APP) 288 sc 637, 344 SE2D 186. 
TEXAS 
GANI V GANI (1973, TEX CIV APP TEXARKANA) 500 SW2D 254. 
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1 2:00 p.m. NOVEMBER 26, 1990 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Holmgren, Mr. Coley is present. 
3 He's requested that I put this to the end of the calendar. 
4 Do you have any objection? 
5 MR. HOLMGREN: Only that I would just like to be 
6 first. 
7 THE COURT: Why will this take any more time than 
8 I think it will take. Shouldn't take very long. 
9 MR. COLEY: There are three or four matters, Your 
10 Honor, there's a motion to strike objections to the orders 
11 and two orders to show cause. Each one is going to require 
12 some testimony. I anticipate it will take some time. 
13 THE COURT: I doubt that it will take as much 
14 time as he anticipates. I think he has some apprehension 
15 about all these attorneys watching his performance. Why 
16 don't we put it over to the end. 
17 (4 o'clock p.m.) 
18 THE COURT: What are we doing? 
19 MR. COLEY: I believe it is my motions. 
20 THE COURT: Pardon? 
21 MR. COLEY: I believe it is my motion, objections 
22 to order to show cause, to proposed minute order and order 
23 to show cause and motion to strike the proposed order. 
24 THE COURT: Well, okay, I guess the first thing 
25 we need to do is consider your objections to the proposed 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
2 
1 order, 
2 MR. COLEY: What I would like to first do is do 
3 the motion to strike. 
4 THE COURT: To strike what? 
5 MR. COLEY: To strike the proposed order. 
6 THE COURT: That's denied. That didn't take 
7 long, now do you want to to talk about your objections, 
8 too? 
9 MR. COLEY: Yes. I don't get a chance to argue 
10 on those objections? 
11 THE COURT: Strike the order, why do you want to 
12 strike the order? 
13 MR. COLEY: There's several reasons. There's a 
14 motion to strike it. 
15 THE COURT: You have to speak up. 
16 MR. HOLMGREN: It's not an order yet. We have 
17 submitted a proposed amended order to the court and I 
18 suppose that — so I am standing in here to speak in favor 
19 of that proposed amended order. I submitted it to the 
20 judge — to the court a few weeks ago, I believe and— 
21 THE COURT: I have been holding it, waiting for 
22 his objections and did you file objections? 
23 MR. COLEY: Sure did, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Are they in the file? I have 
25 never seen them. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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1 MR. COLEY: I believe so. I don't know if they 
2 are in the court file or not. 
3 CLERK: They were filed October 29. 
4 THE COURT: Have I signed these orders to show 
5 cause? Who stamped them? 
6 MR. COLEY: I believe Anita did. 
7 CLERK: And you approved the hearing. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Objections to proposed order 
9 and findings of fact, is that what you are — 
10 MR. COLEY: Prior to that is a motion to strike 
11 those, I think simply stating just a couple things, there's 
12 no authority to amend the order right now. Rule 52A says 
13 that there has to be findings of fact and conclusions of 
14 law. Mr. Holmgren in his proposed order still doesn't have 
15 conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals said immediately 
16 that Rule 52B provides that they have ten days in which to 
17 modify, 59B and E gives you ten days in which to modify 
18 orders. He's had ten days after the order was vacated, the 
19 order is way past the time. That's the basis of the motion 
20 to strike, plus number four, the motion to strike his 
21 inflammatory statements made in there. I can address 
22 those. 
23 THE COURT: Okay, the Court of Appeals, as I 
24 understand it, referred this back to me to make findings of 
25 fact as a basis for the order that I made and you have 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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1 submitted proposed findings of fact. 
2 MR. HOLMGREN: Yes, that is what that is. 
3 Contained within that proposed amended order are proposed 
4 findings of fact. 
5 THE COURT: Amended order on order to show cause, 
6 okay, findings of fact. You are saying that he has to make 
7 conclusions of law? 
8 MR. COLEY: That is correct. I think it is a 
9 case—it is one of of your cases, to have findings of fact 
10 and conclusions of law. 
11 THE COURT: I don't know, do you want to make 
12 some conclusions of law, as well, counsel? All it would 
13 would be based on is the findings that — the findings 
14 would be the same as the — the conclusions would be the 
15 same as the order. 
16 MR. HOLMGREN: Yes. On the next to the last 
17 page, Your Honor, of the proposed amended order it says 
18 that based upon the above findings of fact, it is hereby 
19 ordered and adjudged and decreed, that is, simply to put 
20 conclusions in there would simply be a duplication of the 
21 conclusion that you have reached and the order. 
22 THE COURT: That's what the conclusions would be. 
23 MR. COLEY: I am sure that probably the 
24 conclusions need to be itemized and how can I argue against 
25 them? How can I say, no, the facts don't bear that out? 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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1 He needs to itemize it. 
2 THE COURT: I disagree, I don't think he needs to 
3 make specific conclusions of law, when he's concluded— 
4 MR. COLEY: Okay, the second point of the thing, 
5 we had the same discussion prior to this when I filed my 
6 first objections. He said there was no findings. He said 
7 he didn't need to have findings. You gave the same 
8 argument you just gave. They were incorporated. The Court 
9 of Appeals said, no, they were not incorporated, I think we 
10 are at the same point again. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Holmgren. 
12 MR. HOLMGREN: I don't understand what he is 
13 trying to say there. 
14 THE COURT: He said you haven't made findings of 
15 fact as required by the Court of Appeals, as I understand 
16 it. 
17 MR. HOLMGREN: In this amended order? 
18 MR. COLEY: That is correct. There's no 
19 conclusions. That's here in Salzetti vs. Backman. 
20 MR. HOLMGREN: You have already said that you 
21 agreed with my point on the conclusions of law. If he is 
22 saying I haven't proposed any findings of fact, there they 
23 are identified on page two as findings of fact. 
24 MR. COLEY: Okay, in Salzetti vs. Backman out of 
25 638 P2d at 543, the Supreme Court of Utah states "failure 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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1 to memorialize judgment of contempt by entering written 
2 findings of fact and conclusions was fatal to the 
3 enforceability of the contempt order—" 
4 THE COURT: Counsel, I want to you redo these, 
5 make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
6 then a separate order, okay? 
7 MR. HOLMGREN: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: That should satisfy that objection. 
9 MR. HOLMGREN: I will do that. 
10 THE COURT: What else. 
11 MR. COLEY: This motion is — this proposed order 
12 is not stricken, so I don't have to argue the objections to 
13 this proposed order. 
14 THE COURT: We will wait until you get his new 
15 findings and conclusions then you can—I am not going t o — 
16 MR. HOLMGREN: Otherwise we'll go through this 
17 again. 
18 THE COURT: Let's hear what the objections — 
19 what are your objection to the findings? 
20 MR. COLEY: I would like to stand up here. I 
21 apologize to the court for being back in front of it so 
22 many times. 
23 THE COURT: Well, I suppose you are trying to 
24 stay out of jail. That's what you are trying to do. I 
25 don't blame you for that at all, Mr. Coley. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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1 MR. COLEY: And the file is growing. It's now 
2 getting a little large. 
3 THE COURT: You will have to speak up, I have 
4 trouble— 
5 MR. COLEY: I believe what's happened here since 
6 I am doing this case pro se, Mr. Holmgren, as he told the 
7 Court of Appeals he would give me great latitude decided 
8 that that latitude allowed him to do many things that he's 
9 never done before. 
10 THE COURT: I think what Mr. Holmgren said I was 
11 giving you great latitude. I haven't been giving him great 
12 latitude but giving you latitude to let you stay out of 
13 jail in order to let you do all of this, letting you stay 
14 out of jail. What's wrong with the findings? 
15 MR. COLEY: The findings of fact number one, I 
16 don't have — well, I do, the amount of the figure in 
17 number one the amount of 27,305, that's the amount that he 
18 argued for in — 
19 THE COURT: Well let's not waste a lot of time 
20 Mr. Coley, I haven't got the time to waste, you disagree 
21 with the amount? 
22 MR. COLEY: I disagree with the amount. 
23 THE COURT: How much do you owe? 
24 MR. COLEY: I think an accounting needs to be 
25 done. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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1 THE COURT: You tell me how much you owe. If you 
2 don't have a figure then I am going to accept his figure. 
3 MR. COLEY: I don't have a figure. I would like 
4 to do an accounting. I would like the opportunity to do 
5 that. 
6 THE COURT: That's fine, do your own accounting, 
7 but until then I am accepting this as the amount you owe. 
8 MR. COLEY: Let me make this point then, this is 
9 the same amount he said I owed at the June 18 hearing, 
10 1990—June 18, 1990. 
11 THE COURT: You will be given credit for whatever 
12 amount you have paid subsequent to the determination of 
13 this amount. 
14 MR. COLEY: Number two, he mentions a four 
15 hundred and five hundred dollar payment. However, the 
16 figure in number one does not change, and in this hearing 
17 he's denied ever — the existence of these two payments 
18 that he now gives me credit. 
19 THE COURT: What's wrong with number two? Says 
20 with the exception of a $400 payment in November of '88 and 
21 a hundred dollars payment in December of '88, you have not 
22 paid any support for four years. 
23 MR. COLEY: One of the things that's wrong, I 
24 admit makes no sense is to say this one part, for some four 
25 years not because defendant didn't try to collect. I don't 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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1 know what that means. 
2 THE COURT: It means that the defendant has been 
3 making efforts to collect her child support. Do you deny 
4 that. 
5 MR. COLEY: No, I don't deny that. What he is 
6 trying to say I have not made any payments because—I don't 
7 know what he's trying to say. He shouldn't say that that 
8 is not the reason payments have not been made because she 
9 is trying to collect, I don't think that makes sense. 
10 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
11 MR. COLEY: Nowf I believe the court 
12 probably—number three is probably correct or what's — 
13 THE COURT: Are you planning to go through all of 
14 these one by one? 
15 MR. COLEY: Not all of them, because it's not 
16 important to do all of them. However, there's some things 
17 that are very important to talk about. Number four, Mr. 
18 Coley, starting in the middle, Mr. Coley is much more 
19 intent on resisting his ex-wife's attempts to collect 
20 support and the court's directives than he is in raising 
21 money to support." And you have a copy. I don't see it 
22 anywhere where any of that is ever said by you and any of 
23 it was ever entered into— 
24 THE COURT: I wouldn't have found you in contempt 
25 of court if I would not have felt that way. 
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1 MR. COLEY: I will not argue what you would not 
2 have done or would have done. I can't argue that. 
3 THE COURT: What I have found, Mr. Coley, to make 
4 it very simple to you, that you are educated, you are 
5 healthy, you are capable and you have the ability to get a 
6 job and earn money, that's what I have found. 
7 MR. COLEY: And I have no objections to that, 
8 Your Honor. I have objections to him saying the other 
9 things he said in here, and I think that you have not found 
10 them in the court transcript. They are not in the court 
11 transcript. That's why I had it made up. No conclusions 
12 were made. What Mr. Holmgren is trying to do is trying to 
13 take a hearing that had already occurred and then take the 
14 Court of Appeals vacation of your order and say we'll make 
15 the hearing fit this Court of Appeals vacation. It is not 
16 done. 
17 THE COURT: I will tell what you I am going to 
18 do, I will take these findings and I am going to amend them 
19 to suit my satisfaction. I will make my own findings and 
20 Mr. Holmgren will be satisfied with them as will you. 
21 MR. COLEY: Okay, I appreciate that. You know 
22 there are things — 
23 THE COURT: You may not like what I end up doing. 
24 These are going to be the findings that the court makes, 
25 and usually counsel prepares findings and submits them to 
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1 the court. 
2 MR. COLEY: I understand. 
3 THE COURT: I go over them, look them over. If I 
4 like them, I sign them. If not, I amend them. I intend to 
5 amend these findings to to suit my own feel of what the 
6 evidence supports in terms of findings of fact and 
7 conclusions of law. 
8 MR. COLEY: I appreciate that. I have no 
9 argument. 
10 THE COURT: If you wait before preparing the next 
11 set, Mr. Holmgren, I will get this back to you with my 
12 amendments. 
13 MR. HOLMGREN: Okay. 
14 MR. COLEY: The other two matters, I have served 
15 orders to show cause— 
16 THE COURT: What do you want — what kind of 
17 relief are you asking with regard to those? 
18 MR. COLEY: First relief—several reliefs. 
19 THE COURT: You want her to show cause why— 
20 MR. COLEY: For denying visitation. 
21 THE COURT: She was doing that pursuant to the 
22 order of the court. 
23 MR. COLEY: I am not talking about last time. 
24 THE COURT: What is the original order regarding 
25 visitation? 
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1 MR. COLEY: There's no order regarding 
2 visitation. 
3 MR. HOLMGREN: Every other weekend. On the 
4 weekends when he doesn't have visitation, he has it every 
5 Friday — in other words every other weekend and then over 
6 on these weekends he has it every Friday. 
7 THE COURT: Alternate weekends he has it on — 
8 every other weekend he has visitation, then on alternate 
9 weekends he has visitation on Fridays only. 
10 MR. COLEY: That is right. 
11 MR. HOLMGREN: Then I think he has three weeks in 
12 the summer. 
13 THE COURT: And what is your contention regarding 
14 that? 
15 MR. COLEY: Okay. Simply that since the order 
16 was signed—this is an amended order giving me three weeks 
17 visitation. I never received it except the first time in 
18 August I had it. The next six times—or for six years 
19 consecutively she's found an excuse why not to give it to 
20 me, she very seldom gives me visitation on alternate 
21 Fridays. She said it is inconvenient. She's filed 
22 motions. She said it is inconvenient for her. She doesn't 
23 want to have it anymore. She denied my visitation from 
24 February 8, '89 to January or December of 1989. 
25 THE COURT: When did you last visit with your 
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1 child? 
2 MR. COLEY: I had her on Thanksgiving. What I 
3 wanted to bring up since this order was vacated, it's taken 
4 me seven to ten phone calls each time to arrange for 
5 visitation. What I would really like is a couple things. 
6 I would like to have a place where I could pick up my 
7 daughter certain every week so that I can know I can be 
8 there. So I don't have to go up there and wait three or 
9 four hours. I would like to have more time in the 
10 summertime to be with my daughter—she's denied me for the 
11 seven years or six years that she's denied my summer 
12 visitation. And then the other thing I would like, Your 
13 Honor, is I have had to prepare because of this order, this 
14 proposed order I have had expenses of preparing the 
15 transcripts so that we could find out what really went on 
16 and I would like to be credited with the cost of the 
17 transcripts and the cost that it's cost me which is about a 
18 hundred fifty dollars towards payments. 
19 THE COURT: You know, what is going to happen 
20 here, Mr. Coley, I guess you don't realize what is 
21 happening. The Court of Appeals didn't deny my right to 
22 order you not to have visitation with your child, what they 
23 did is say that the order wasn't supported by proper 
24 findings. 
25 MR. COLEY: I understand that. 
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1 THE COURT: What is going to happen, I am going 
2 to make proper findings and again enter an order denying 
3 you visitation* 
4 MR. COLEY: But, Your Honor, may I ask this 
5 question? If there are no facts, if in this transcript 
6 here there's no evidence that shows that it is in the best 
7 interest of my daughter to be denied my visitation, can you 
8 now enter in in findings of fact in a hearing that didn't 
9 have evidence in it? 
10 THE COURT: I found initially that there were 
11 sufficient facts upon which to base that order. I am going 
12 to prepare findings of fact that will support that order 
13 now. And I am going to enter it so you will again be 
14 denied visitation. 
15 MR. COLEY: I think the court will vacate it as 
16 soon as you enter that. 
17 THE COURT: I guess you will have to keep going 
18 back through that. 
19 MR. COLEY: I will go back. And it has to be 
20 done in the best interests of the child. That's what the 
21 law says. There's no findings in here, no evidence of the 
22 best interests of the child being served by my being 
23 denied— 
24 THE COURT: I found differently. Apparently, you 
25 and I see the evidence quite differently. 
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1 MR. COLEY: The transcript is here. 
2 THE COURT: There's the issue of your contempt. 
3 When do we get to that? 
4 MR. COLEY: I asked for a review hearing. I was 
5 told as long as I kept the payment u p — 
6 THE COURT: Have you kept them up? 
7 MR. COLEY: If you give me credit for the hundred 
8 fifty dollars, I have a hundred dollars to pay her today, 
9 that will --
10 THE COURT: What I am talking about is payments 
11 made to your wife for the support of your child. 
12 MR. COLEY: That's what I am talking— 
13 THE COURT: Did you make a payment today? 
14 MR. COLEY: I have it with me to make today, a 
15 hundred dollars today. I would like credit for the hundred 
16 fifty dollars because I had to — 
17 THE COURT: What's the present order, Mr. 
18 Holmgren, I can't — I can't keep track of this. 
19 MR. HOLMGREN: Well — 
20 THE COURT: With regard to support payments what 
21 he's supposed to be doing. 
22 MR. HOLMGREN: Two hundred fifty dollars 
23 on-going. But to stay out of jail, you told him fifty 
24 dollars a week, and I have provided you with an exhibit 
25 that shows that he has not done that. It is Mr. Coley's 
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